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NOTES
THE LEGALITY OF LOCK-UPS UNDER SECTION 14(E) OF
THE WILLIAMS ACT: BALANCING THE SCALES
Corporate acquisitions through cash tender offers have become
increasingly popular in recent years.1 Tender offers enable poten-
tial buyers to bargain directly with the target corporation's stock-
holders, with or without management approval, in an attempt to
gain a controlling interest.2 Target managements have responded
aggressively to hostile takeover bids. Companies faced with hostile
tender offers have developed sophisticated tactics to defeat them.'
The most popular defense is the "lock-up," an amicable arrange-
ment between the target and another corporation that gives the
friendly corporation a competitive advantage over the hostile
tender offeror in a bidding contest for the target's stock.4
Management traditionally has enjoyed wide latitude in employ-
ing such tactics under state fiduciary laws.5 Its discretion, however,
1. See Prentice, Target Board Abuse of Defenswe Tactics: Can Federal Law Be Mobil-
ized to Overcome the Business Judgment Rule?, 8 J. CORP. LAW 337 (1983).
2. Comment, Tender Offers, Lock-ups and the Williams Act: A Critical Analysis of Mo-
bil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 21 DuQ. L. RPv. 669, 672 (1983).
3. See Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64
CORNELL L. REv. 901, 901-02 (1974); Prentice, supra note 1, at 339-43.
4. Fraidin & Franco, Lock-up Arrangements, 14 Rxv. SEC. REG. 821, 821 (1981).
5. State corporate law generally employs one of two approaches in examining the scope of
management's fiduciary duties. The "business judgment rule" states that a director who
exercises his good faith business judgment in choosing a particular course of action will not
be liable even if that judgment is faulty. Courts presume that management has acted prop-
erly and in good faith in matters requiring business judgment. Arsht, The Business Judg-
ment Rule Revisited, 8 HoFsTRA L. REv. 93, 111-12 (1979); Note, Lock-up Options: Toward
a State Law Standard, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1068, 1076-77 (1983). The "primary purpose test,"
used by the Delaware courts, requires management to demonstrate that the primary pur-
pose of the challenged action was to further the corporation's interests. See, e.g., Bennett v.
Propp, 41 Del. 14, 22, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (1962). Neither standard provides a serious obstacle
to a corporation opposing a takeover bid. See Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Care Corp., 638
F.2d 357, 382-84 (2d Cir. 1980) (approving managements behavior in a takeover contest
under the business judgment rule); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964) (al-
lowing, under the primary purpose test, management to repurchase shares to thwart a take-
over attempt).
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is narrower under federal law. Section 14(e) of the Williams Act6
provides that "[ilt shall be unlawful for any person. . . to engage
in any fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices, in
connection with any tender offer. . . . " The definition of "manip-
ulative acts" under section 14(e) governs the extent to which fed-
eral securities law restricts management's use of defensive maneu-
vers to resist tender offers.
In Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.," the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit became one of the first courts to
question seriously the legality of defensive tactics under section
14(e). 9 In a widely criticized opinion,"' the court held that certain
lock-up arrangements were "manipulative acts" prohibited by the
Williams Act.11 Since Mobil, courts have struggled to characterize
manipulation in the contested takeover bid context. This struggle
has produced confusion. Nearly three years after Mobil, no consen-
sus exists regarding the scope of manipulative behavior under sec-
tion 14(e). 2
This Note discusses the proper standard for determining
whether lock-ups and other defenses to hostile tender offers are
6. Williams Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968). The Williams Act provides
comprehensive regulation of the tender offer process. Congress enacted the Act in 1968 pri-
marily to protect the target shareholder's interests. See infra text accompanying notes 83-
86. The act added § 13(d)-(e), 15 U.S.C. 78m(d)-(e) (1982) and § 14 (d)-(f), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d)-(f) (1982) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
8. 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
9. Some courts previously had invalidated defensive maneuvers by reading into section
14(e) a federal fiduciary standard. See, e.g., Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc. v. Milgo Elec.
Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). The Supreme Court discredited this approach, however, in Santa Fe Indus.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). But see Lynch & Steinburg, supra note 3 (arguing for a
federal fiduciary standard).
10. See, e.g., Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1983);
Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1983); Schreiber v. Burlington
Northern, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 197, 203 (D. Del. 1983); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp.,
549 F. Supp. 623, 630 (D. Md. 1982); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413, 422
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Prentice, supra note 1, at 353-58; Comment, supra note 2; Note, Tender
Offer Defensive Tactics-Federal Regulation of Management's Prerogative, 10 FORDHAM
Ua. L.J. 633, 650-52 (1982); Note, "Lock-up" Enjoined Under Section 14(e) of Securities
Exchange Act, 12 SEroN HALL L.J. 881, 891-95 (1982).
11. See 669 F.2d at 374-76.
12. Presently, the majority rule appears to be the "deception test," which equates manip-
ulation with misrepresentation. See infra text accompanying notes 38-55.
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"manipulative acts" under section 14(e). The Note describes
briefly how lock-up arrangements work. It then examines the dif-
ferent approaches courts have used to define section 14(e) manipu-
lation. After identifying the general purpose and specific goals of
the Williams Act, the Note rejects the traditional rule of equating
manipulation with deception or misrepresentation. Instead, the
Note concludes that defensive tactics tending to disrupt the com-
petitive balance between a target corporation and a tender offeror
are the proper object of the Act's prohibition of manipulation.
LOCK-UPS
In a tender offer, a corporation13 publicly offers to purchase from
shareholders all or a substantial portion of a publicly owned corpo-
ration's stock.14 A merger between the target and the acquiring
corporation usually follows the offeror's successful purchase of a
controlling interest in the target.1 5 Although the tender offer pro-
cess is simple in theory,16 it becomes complicated in practice when
the target management actively opposes the takeover bid. Techni-
cally, this opposition occurs because management either wants to
wait for a better offer1 7 or believes that the resulting acquisition
would contravene the shareholders' "best interest." 8 Practically,
however, management's real motivation is usually self-preserva-
tion.19 Consequently, their actions in lock-ups often neither re-
present nor protect the shareholders' interests.
A variety of tactics can defeat unwanted takeover bids.20 The
lock-up is the most popular, and possibly the most effective, de-
13. This Note will assume that any tender offeror is a corporation. Groups and individu-
als, however, also make tender offers.
14. Comment, supra note 2, at 671.
15. Id. at 672.
16. Note, The Courts and the Williams Act: Try a Little Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV.
991, 992-93 (1973).
17. Id. at 995.
18. Comment, supra note 2, at 679; Note, supra note 16, at 995.
19. See Bromberg, Tender Offers: Safeguards and Restraints-An Interest Analysis, 21
CAs E W. REs. L. REv. 613, 656 (1970); Comment, supra note 2, at 679.
20. See Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 3, at 901-02; Prentice, supra note 1, at 339-43;
Weiss, Defensive Responses to Tender Offers and the Williams Act's Prohibition Against
Manipulation, 35 VAm. L. REv. 1087, 1121-28 (1982).
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fense. A defensive lock-up2 ' involves an agreement, made in re-
sponse to a hostile tender offer, between the target corporation and
another company, often called a "white knight." The white knight
agrees to make a tender offer higher than the hostile bid. In return,
the target's management makes concessions that increase the like-
lihood that the white knight's offer will succeed.22 A lock-up is any
such concession.
Defensive lock-ups fall into two categories. In a stock lock-up,
which is the most common, the target corporation either grants the
white knight an option to purchase target shares owned by the cor-
poration or actually sells those share to the white knight.2 3 For ex-
ample, consider a hostile offer of $20 per share. The white knight
might offer $30 per share with an option to purchase twenty per-
cent of the target's shares at the same price.2 4 This lock-up facili-
tates the friendly takeover in two ways. First, it decreases the
number of shares the white knight must acquire to control the tar-
get.25 Assuming both offerors need fifty percent of the stock, the
white knight can gain control by exercising its option even if share-
holders sell only thirty percent of their shares. Conversely, the hos-
tile bidder must purchase fifty percent of the target's shares.
The second way that the stock lock-up facilitates the friendly
takeover is by giving the favored offeror an advantage in a later
bidding contest.26 If the hostile bidder in the above example raised
its offer to $35 per share, it would have to purchase fifty percent of
21. Target managements do not use all lock-ups defensively. The target may employ a
lock-up agreement to facilitate a negotiated merger with a single, friendly tender offeror. In
addition, takeover bidders may employ offensive lock-ups, which are arrangements negoti-
ated with target shareholders to help insure the takeover bid's success. Bialkin & Lampert,
Lock-up Devices in Friendly and Hostile Acquisitions, 1 14TH ANN. INST. ON SEc. REG. 669,
674-75 (1982).
22. Bialkin & Lampert, supra note 21, at 674; Fraidin & Franco, supra note 4, at 821.
23. Bialkin & Lampert, supra note 21, at 679-80; Comment, supra note 2, at 676. For
examples of stock lock-ups, see Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1
(2d Cir. 1983); Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
24. Frequently, the option price will be lower than the white knight's offer price, giving
the white knight an even greater economic advantage over the hostile bidder in a subse-
quent bidding contest. See infra text accompanying notes 88-89.
25. At the same time, of course, such a lock-up decreases the likelihood that the hostile
bidder will be able to purchase the desired percentage of stock. Because the white knight
now owns twenty percent of the shares, the hostile offeror must receive all its tenders from
the remaining eighty percent. See Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 3, at 934.
26. Bialkin & Lampert, supra note 21, at 679-80.
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the stock at that price. To defeat that offer, however, the white
knight must buy only thirty percent of the shares at the higher
price and the remainder at $30. If one million shares were out-
standing, the white knight could offer $40 per share for almost the
same cost as the hostile offeror's $35 bid.17
The second form of defensive lock-up concerns the target's as-
sets. In the asset lock-up, the target corporation sells to a friendly
bidder, or grants the friendly bidder an option to buy, a highly
valued asset.28 In appropriate circumstances, this device is more
effective than most stock lock-ups. If the asset is important to the
target's attractiveness-to the extent that the offeror is unwilling
to acquire the target without that asset-the lock-up will deter
bidding completely.29 Even a tenacious bidder cannot overcome an
asset lock-up. Once the parties execute the lock-up agreement, the
hostile tender offeror cannot acquire both the target and its most
attractive asset.
Besides their usefulness as a defensive technique, lock-ups also
benefit target corporations by stimulating competition. Even if the
original tender offer is acceptable, management can use lock-ups to
lure other bidders into the market.30 Some potential offerors may
be unwilling to bid for the target's stock without a lock-up ar-
rangement.3 1 Lock-ups provide security for these parties. They also
may allow the unsuccessful bidder to recover its expenses by resel-
ling the acquired shares at the higher price of the winning offer.32
In short, lock-ups often are essential for securing the highest price
for target stock.
Target corporations use lock-ups and other defensive tactics ex-
27. The hostile bidder's cost for its $35 bid would be $17,500,000 ($35 x 500,000 shares).
The white knight's costs for its $40 bid would be $18,000,000 ($30 x 200,000) + ($40 x
300,000). See also Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 375-76 (6th Cir. 1981).
28. Bialkin & Lampert, supra note 21, at 681-82; Comment, supra note 2, at 677. For
examples of asset lock-ups, see Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir.
1981); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
29. To be effective, the locked-up asset actually must be the targets "crown jewel," the
key to the target's attractiveness. If the target corporation consists of several attractive op-
erations, this tactic probably will be unsuccessful. Nathan, Lock-Ups and Leg-Ups: The
Search for Security in the Acquisitions Market Place, 13TH ANN. INST. SEC. REG. 13, 77
(1981).
30. Fraidin & Franco, supra note 4, at 823.
31. Id.
32. Id.
1984] 119
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
tensively. Since Mobil, however, their legality under section 14(e)
of the Williams Act has remained in doubt. Deciding how courts
should view these devices requires analysis of the different judicial
definitions of "manipulative acts."
DEFINING MANIPULATION UNDER SECTION 14(E): THREE JUDICIAL
APPROACHES
Because the Williams Act does not define "manipulative acts,"
courts have formulated their own definitions based on congres-
sional intent and legislative history. Three basic definitions of sec-
tion 14(e) manipulation have emerged from this case-by-case ap-
proach. The traditional approach equates manipulation with
misrepresentation, thus making deception an essential element of a
section 14(e) violation.3 3 The court in Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil
Co.3 4 rejected this approach, ruling instead that a lock-up device is
manipulative if it artificially affects the market for the target's
stock.35 The United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York proposed a third approach in Data Probe Acquisition
Corp. v. Datatab, Inc."6 The court in Data Probe held that a lock-
up arrangement is manipulative under section 14(e) if it unduly
obstructs the exercise of informed and effective shareholder
choice.3
The Traditional Approach-The Deception Test
Courts applying the deception test hold that manipulation can-
not exist under section 14(e) without evidence of misrepresenta-
tion, deception, or deceit. 8 The only issue under this definition is
33. See, e.g., Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983);
Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983); Schreiber v. Burlington
Northern, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 197 (D. Del. 1983); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549
F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982).
34. 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
35. See id. at 374.
36. 568 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983).
37. See id. at 1545, 1547.
38. See, e.g., Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1983);
Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1983); Atchley v. Qonaar Corp.,
704 F.2d 355, 359 (7th Cir. 1983); Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 288 (4th Cir. 1983);
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 283 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981); Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1980); Schreiber v. Burlington
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whether the alleged wrongdoer disclosed complete and truthful in-
formation regarding the challeged activity.3 9 No activity, regardless
of the consequences, is inherently manipulative unless it necessa-
rily involves deception. In effect, then, the deception test is non-
definitional. By equating manipulation with non-disclosure, the
test adds nothing to the meaning of section 14(e). It merely echoes
the prohibition of fraudulent and deceptive acts already present in
the section. 40
United States Supreme Court discussions both of manipulation41
and of the legislative history of the Williams Act 42 account for the
element of deception recognized by many courts in defining section
14(e) manipulation. The Court has never discussed manipulation
directly within the context of the Williams Act. It has examined,
however, the scope of manipulation under section 10(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934,43 which contains language very simi-
lar to that in section 14(e).44
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,45 the Supreme Court main-
tained that "manipulative" in section 10(b) "connotes intentional
or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by con-
trolling or artificially affecting the price of securities. '46 In Santa
Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,47 another section 10(b) case, the
Court defined manipulative actions as those "intended to mislead
investors by artificially affecting the price of securities. ' 48 Both
Northern, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 197, 202 (D. Del. 1983); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp.,
549 F. Supp. 623, 628 (D. Md. 1982).
39. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 628 (D. Md. 1982).
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
41. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185 (1976).
42. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422
U.S. 49 (1975).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982). Section 10(b) applies to the sale of any security, unlike section
14(e) of the Williams Act, which covers only the tender offer process.
44. Section 10(b) provides as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any person... to use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security... any manipulative or
deceptive device ... ." 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982) (emphasis added).
45. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
46. Id. at 199 (emphasis added).
47. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
48. Id. at 476 (emphasis added).
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definitions, at least implicitly, require an element of deception.49
The validity of the deception test rests on the premise that be-
cause section 14(e) is almost identical to section 10(b), the decep-
tion requirement also applies to section 14(e).50
The deception test also derives support from the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the legislative history of the Williams Act.
In Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,51 the Court held that a
defeated tender offeror did not have standing to bring an action
under section 14(e) in its capacity as a takeover bidder.5 2 After re-
viewing the Act's legislative history, the Court determined that
Congress intended to protect only investors.5 3 To that end, the
Williams Act was purely a disclosure statute, "designed solely to
get needed information to the investor."" Under the deception
test, manipulation occurs only when management (or the offeror)
withholds necessary information from the shareholders.55
Several courts have adopted the deception test in various con-
texts.86 Most recently, in Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab,
Inc.,57 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
applied the deception test to a lock-up arrangement. Datatab and
CRC Information Systems executed a merger agreement under
which CRC would purchase Datatab's outstanding shares for $1.00
per share.58 Data Probe then entered into competition with CRC,
making a tender offer of $1.25 per share for Datatab's stock.59 Af-
ter negotiating with Datatab, CRC agreed to counter the hostile
49. See Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 197, 202 (D. Del. 1983);
Prentice, supra note 1, at 354.
50. Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1983); Billard v.
Rockwell Intern. Corp., 683 F.2d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1982).
51. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
52. See id.
53. See id. at 30-31.
54. Id. at 31.
55. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 628 (D. Md. 1982).
56. See supra note 38.
57. 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983).
58. A financially troubled company, Datatab first approached CRC to inquire if CRC
would be willing to purchase the corporation. Id. at 2. The terms of the merger agreement
suggest that the officers did not act wholly with unselfish motives. For instance, Datatab's
three principal officers were to receive new three-year employment contracts. Id.
59. Id.
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bid by raising its offer to $1.40 per share. 0 In return, CRC received
an option to purchase an amount of Datatab's authorized but unis-
sued stock that would be the equivalent of two hundred percent of
the target's outstanding shares.61 This enabled CRC to effect the
merger simply by exercising its option.6 2
Despite the impact of this lock-up option on Datatab's share-
holders, the court held that the arrangement did not violate sec-
tion 14(e) because Datatab had met disclosure requirements.63 The
court emphasized that the proper standard for determining the le-
gality of tender offers is the adequacy of disclosure rather than the
substantive validity of defensive tactics." The fairness of the lock-
up was irrelevant; absent misrepresentation, no right of action ex-
isted under section 14(e).6 5
In Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Crp.,eS the Second Circuit chose
another instance in which to apply the deception test in a case in-
volving a lock-up agreement. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corporation made
a tender offer of $25 per share for Buffalo Forge stock.67 Buffalo
Forge's directors resisted, and entered into an agreement under
which Ogden purchased 425,000 treasury shares s at $32.75 per
share with an option to buy 143,400 additional shares.69 The court
found that this lock-up was not manipulative.70 Buffalo Forge had
engaged in no misleading acts" and, according to the court, an "es-
sential ingredient" of section 14(e) manipulation is "the omission
60. Id. at 3.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 4-5.
64. Id. at 4. The court asserted that examination of the substantive validity of defensive
tactics would federalize the law of fiduciary duty, an approach that was discredited by the
holding of the Supreme Court in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477
(1977). See id.
65. Id.
66. 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983).
67. Id. at 758.
68. Treasury shares are stock that is issued and then reacquired by the corporation to be
used for corporate purposes. BLACK'S LAW DIcnoNARY 1346 (5th ed. 1979).
69. 717 F.2d at 758-59. Ampco eventually won the subsequent bidding war despite the
lock-up arrangement. Ampco then refused to allow Ogden to exercise its option, claiming
that the option agreement was a manipulative device under section 14(e). Id. at 759.
70. See id. at 760.
71. Id.
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or misstatement of material facts." 2
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland
defended the deception test in Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix
Corp.7-3 The case involved an aggressive response to a hostile take-
over bid. When Bendix announced a tender offer to acquire a con-
trolling interest in Marietta, Marietta's management countered
with a tender offer for a majority of Bendix's stock.7 4 In addition
to accusing Marietta of inadequate disclosure, Bendix alleged that
the defensive tactic was a manipulative act under section 14(e).7 5
The court rejected Bendix's claim and refused to consider the
effect of Marietta's bid.76 It maintained that deception was a nec-
essary element of a section 14(e) violation.77 In this way, the court
treated the manipulation analysis as identical to the disclosure
analysis.78 Marietta's intent td inhibit Bendix's tender offer was
irrelevant.7 9
Despite its popularity, the deception test misinterprets section
14(e). A careful analysis of both the legislative history of the Wil-
liams Act and relevant Supreme Court decisions reveals that the
test frustrates congressional intent by ignoring section 14(e)'s role
in the overall statutory scheme. The test overemphasizes the few
Supreme Court pronouncements concerning the manipulation
issue.
The Williams Act: General Purpose
The Williams Act does not define the "manipulative acts" that it
proscribes. Because the statute itself is open to several interpreta-
tions, courts must turn to the legislative history of the Act.80 This
history, however, fails to clarify the scope of section 14(e) manipu-
lation. 81 Consequently, the general purpose of the Williams Act,
72. Id.
73. 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982).
74. Id. at 625.
75. Id. at 626.
76. Id. at 627-31.
77. Id. at 628-30.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See 2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 48.04 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1973).
81. Neither Congressmen nor witnesses discussed the exact definition of section 14(e) in
either the Senate Hearings, the House Hearings, or on the Senate Floor.
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and Congress' method of accomplishing that purpose, must provide
some guidelines.82
The legislative history of the Williams Act reveals that the Act's
only purpose was to protect the target's shareholders,83 the rightful
beneficiaries of the tender offer process. Introducing the bill on the
Senate floor, Senator Harrison Williams emphasized that it would
"close a significant gap in investor protection under the federal se-
curities laws. ' ' 4
Testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on Securities, then
SEC Chairman Manuel Cohen reiterated Williams' objective:
"[W]e are concerned with the investor who today is just a pawn in
a form of industrial warfare.... The investor [during takeover
bids] is lost somewhere in the shuffle. This is our only concern."8 5
Congress recognized that because shareholders had no means of
safeguarding their rights adequately during tender offers they
needed a "more effective champion."8 The Williams Act was in-
tended to be that champion of investor rights.
In Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,87 the Supreme Court en-
dorsed the view that the primary purpose of the Williams Act was
investor protection. The Court analyzed thoroughly the Act's legis-
lative history,"m and concluded that the legislation protects only
the target's shareholders. The Act confers no privileges on tender
offerors.8 9 The Court maintained that "the sole purpose of the Wil-
liams Act was the protection of investors who are confronted with
82. See Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
932 (1972); Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145, 1153
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Weiss, supra note 20, at 1098.
83. All courts and commentators agree that Congress' intent was investor protection. The
debate concerns the nature and extent of that protection. See supra note 6; see infra text
accompanying notes 84-86.
84. 113 CONG. REc. 854 (1967) (emphasis added).
85. Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids:
Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Seas. 178 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings].
86. Id. at 57 (testimony of Prof. Samuel L. Hayes, I, Columbia Univ. Grad. School of
Business).
87. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
88. See id. at 26-35.
89. Id. at 35; see supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
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a tender offer."" °
Proponents of the deception test agree that the purpose of the
Williams Act was investor protection."" They fail to realize, how-
ever, that investor protection had for Congress a very specific
meaning: safeguarding the investors' position as the ultimate deci-
sion-makers in the tender offer process. Congress recognized that
true investor protection meant protecting the shareholders' ability
both to decide whether to tender their shares and, if deciding to
tender, to choose between competing bidders.9 2 Congress sought to
ensure, therefore, not only that investors would receive adequate
information but also that they would be able to use that informa-
tion to make meaningful decisions.93 In short, the Act's general
purpose was to guarantee informed and effective shareholder
choice.
The district court in Data Probe properly identified the purpose
of the Williams Act to be the protection of investors' decision-
making role.94 After analyzing the Act's history to determine Con-
gress' notion of investor protection, the court decided that Con-
gress equated such protection with unhindered shareholder
choice.9 5 Congress intended that neither target management nor
tender offerors would be able to interfere with investors' decision-
making prerogative. 96
The legislative history of the Williams Act shows that Congress
designed the Act to prevent tender offer participants from under-
mining meaningful shareholder choice. Chairman Cohen in partic-
ular emphasized the importance of investor decision-making. Ac-
cording to Cohen, the Act's goal was to provide investors with an
90. 430 U.S. at 35.
91. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
92. See Senate Hearings, supra note 85, at 181 (testimony of Manuel Cohen, SEC Chair-
man). Chairman Cohen noted: "The decision whether to tender or to take other action in
consequence of the tender offer is an important decision. It should be made only after care-
ful consideration and with full knowledge of the facts." Id.
93. See id. at 188 (testimony of Manuel Cohen, SEC Chairman); see also Hi-Shear Indus.
v. Campbell, [1981] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,804, at 90, 031 (D.S.C. 1981) (the Williams
Act "contemplates unfettered choice by well-informed investors").
94. Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D.N.Y. 1983),
reo'd, 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983).
95. Id. at 1545-48.
96. See id.; see infra text accompanying notes 162-64.
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opportunity to make a tender offer decision "without being subject
to unwarranted techniques which are designed to prevent that
from happening. ''97
Cohen also wanted the SEC to help ensure effective shareholdser
choice. He believed that Congress should design the SEC's regula-
tory power "to give the investor the fairest possible opportunity to
make his own investment decisions." '98 Finally, Cohen recognized
that the Williams Act, through both disclosure and other methods,
would "give investors a fair opportunity to reach informed judg-
ments ... and to act accordingly."99
The deception test is invalid because it contradicts this congres-
sional goal of meaningful shareholder choice. Requiring full dis-
closure from the tender offer participants clearly is essential to
providing freedom of choice. Disclosure alone, however, offers little
meaningful protection. Unless checked, management or tender of-
ferors can employ tactics that essentially remove any decision-
making privilege from even an informed investor.100 Information is
worthless unless the target shareholder also is guaranteed an op-
portunity to use the information to make his own investment deci-
sions.101 Mere disclosure does not ensure an effective exercise of an
informed choice, and thus the deception test undermines rather
than promotes the general purpose of the Williams Act.
The Supreme Court View
Courts that treat misrepresentation as the only element of sec-
tion 14(e) manipulation maintain that the United States Supreme
Court has identified disclosure as the fundamental goal of the Wil-
liams Act.102 They cite Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.10 3 and
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green'" to support this proposition
97. Senate Hearings, supra note 85, at 15.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 188 (emphasis added).
100. Chairman Cohen recognized the "ability of incumbent management to frustrate an
attractive and desirable tender offer." Id. at 184.
101. Proponents of the deception test erroneously assume that once a shareholder pos-
sesses adequate information, he can protect his own interests. Even an informed investor
will be powerless during an all-out takeover contest.
102. See supra note 38.
103. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
104. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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without considering the Act's purpose.10 5
Neither case mandates interpreting the Williams Act as solely a
disclosure statute. In Piper the Court attempted to demonstrate
only that Congress' purpose in passing the Act was investor protec-
tion.10 6 Although the Court emphasized the disclosure language in
the legislative history, 0 7 it did so only to support its conclusion
that the Act protected the investor alone. 08 The Court never
stated that disclosure was the only method of protection under the
Williams Act.
In Santa Fe, the Court did not discuss the Williams Act, but did
consider the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In its interpretation
of section 10(b) of that Act, the counterpart of section 14(e), 0 e the
Court held that the "fundamental purpose" of the 1934 Act was to
require full disclosure. 10 Supporters of the deception test argue
that, by implication, the purpose of the Williams Act is
identical."'
The Court's interpretation of section 10(b) does not apply with
equal force to the Williams Act." 2 Although both the 1934 Act and
the Williams Act attempt to protect investors, their methods dif-
fer. The 1934 Act regulates securities trading." 3 In that context,
once the investors receive adequate information about a given cor-
poration, they can pursue their interests without interference.
They do not need a statute protecting their right to trade freely;
the market is open to all. The Williams Act, on the other hand,
regulates tender offers. Investors in a tender offer situation require
different protection because they are not guaranteed unhindered
participation in the tender offer market." 4 Takeover battles fre-
105. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 628 (D. Md. 1982).
106. See 430 U.S. at 26-35.
107. See id. at 26-35.
108. See id. at 35.
109. See supra note 44.
110. 430 U.S. at 477-78.
111. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 197, 203 (D. Del.
1983).
112. Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538, 1544 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd, 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983); Weiss, supra note 20, at 1097-98.
113. Weiss, supra note 20, at 1097.
114. See Senate Hearings, supra note 85, at 15 (testimony of Manuel Cohen, SEC
Chairman).
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quently involve maneuvers designed to "distort or even abort the
investment decision. ' 115 Consequently, merely providing informa-
tion is insufficient. In the tender offer context, investor protection
requires a guarantee of effective investor participation. 16 The de-
ception test's complete reliance on disclosure fails to implement
adequately this goal of effective investor protection.
The Artificial Effect Test
In Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.,'" the Sixth Circuit directly
challenged the validity of the deception test. The court ruled that
two lock-up devices used by Marathon to fend off Mobil's tender
offer were manipulative acts prohibited by the Williams Act, even
though neither device employed deception."' In the process, the
court adopted a definition of manipulation that went beyond de-
ception. The court held that "manipulation is an affecting of the
market for, or the price of, securities by artificial means."" 9 In
short, nondisclosure alone was insufficient to establish a violation
of section 14(e).2 0
The court in Mobil considered both stock lock-up and asset lock-
up arrangements. Mobil announced its plan to purchase up to 40
million shares of Marathon's stock for $85 per share. 21 Opposing
any merger with Mobil, Marathon's directors sought a more attrac-
tive takeover bidder. 22 After negotiations with several potential
115. Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538, 1544 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd, 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983).
116. See id. at 1545-48.
117. 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
118. See id. at 377.
119. Id. at 374 (emphasis in original).
120. Id. at 376-77. The court emphasized that "to find compliance with section 14(e)
solely by the full disclosure of a manipulative device... would be to read the 'manipulative
acts and practices' language completely out of the Williams Act" Id. at 377.
121. Id. at 367.
122. Simultaneously, Marathon filed suit against Mobil, asserting that a Marathon-Mobil
merger would violate antitrust laws. See id. Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 530 F. Supp.
315, 317 (N.D. Ohio 1981). The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio issued a preliminary injunction blocking the proposed acquisition. See id. at 326. The
Sixth Circuit affirmed the injunctive relief on the same day it ruled on the section 14(e)
claims. See Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378, 383-84 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982).
Judge Merritt dissented from the court's decision that Marathon's defensive tactics were
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white knights, Marathon executed a merger agreement with United
States Steel.
123
U.S. Steel agreed to make a tender offer for thirty million Mara-
thon shares at $125 per share in return for two significant conces-
sions.124 First, Marathon granted U.S. Steel an option to purchase
ten million authorized-but-unissued Marathon shares for $90 per
share.1 25 Second, U.S. Steel received an option to purchase Mara-
thon's interest in the Yates Oil Field.1 26 U.S. Steel could exercise
the second option only if a third party acquired Marathon. 127
As with the proponents of the deception test, the court turned to
the Supreme Court's analysis of manipulation under section 10(b)
in Ernst & Ernst 12 and Santa Fe 129 to determine the parameters
of section 14(e) manipulation. The court nevertheless ignored the
references to deception in those passages.130 It focused instead on
the language in both cases that characterized manipulation as ac-
tivity "artificially affecting" the securities market.' The key issue
in Mobil, therefore, was the lock-up's effect on "normal healthy
market activity.' 3 2 The court expressly rejected the view that sec-
tion 14(e) only required adequate disclosure. 3 Using this analysis,
the court had little difficulty finding that both lock-up agreements
violated section 14(e).3 Both artificially affected market activity
by deterring competitive bidding for Marathon's stock.3 5 This, in
manipulative on the ground that Mobil's section 14(e) claim was moot following the disposi-
tion of the antitrust case. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 378 (6th Cir. 1981)
(Merritt, J., dissenting).
123. 669 F.2d at 367.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
129. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 46-50.
131. See 669 F.2d at 374. A few courts have identified an artificial market effect as an
element of the deception test. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 568 F. Supp.
197, 202 (D. Del. 1983) ("The manipulative activity must artificially affect the market price
and do so in a misleading or deceptive manner.") (emphasis in original).
132. 669 F.2d at 374.
133. See id. at 376-77. The court determined that deception was an irrelevant factor in
defining manipulation. See id.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 375.
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turn, created a $125 per share price ceiling on that stock.136
The Yates Field option presented the easier problem. The court
noted that Marathon was an attractive target, especially to Mobil,
only because of its holdings in Yates Field, one of the world's most
productive oil fields.13 7 Because the lock-up ensured that only U.S.
Steel could acquire both Marathon and the Field, Mobil's interest
in continued bidding decreased substantially.'38 In fact, the court
apparently assumed that no offeror would be willing to top U.S.
Steel's offer if Yates Field was not included in the deal. 3 9 Further-
more, the court emphasized that Marathon designed the option
solely to preclude competition; U.S. Steel could exercise the option
only if it was outbid by a third party. 140
The court held that the stock lock-up also deterred bidding by
giving U.S. Steel an unfair advantage over other offerors.' 4' Al-
though any other bidder would have had to acquire the necessary
forty million shares at full offer price, U.S. Steel needed to
purchase only thirty million shares at market price after obtaining
ten million shares at a bargain price. 42 Thus, Mobil was signifi-
cantly disadvantaged because it, or any other offeror, would have
to pay about $1.2 billion more than U.S. Steel to match the latter's
bid.143 By discouraging competition, both lock-up arrangements
"circumvent[ed] the natural forces of market demand" in the take-
over contest.'4
Some courts have rejected the Mobil approach expressly. 145
Others, especially those dealing with lock-up devices, have ac-
136. Id.
137. Id. at 367-68, 375.
138. Id. at 375. The court noted that the two other potential white knights negotiating
with Marathon indicated that they only would consider a tender offer if given an option to
purchase Yates Field. See id. at 368.
139. See id. at 375.
140. See id. Weiss, supra note 20, at 1094.
141. See 669 F.2d at 375.
142. See id. at 375-76.
143. See id.; cf. supra note 27 and accompanying text.
144. 669 F.2d at 376.
145. See, e.g., Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1983);
Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1983); Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn,
701 F.2d 278, 288 (4th Cir. 1983); Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 197,
203 (D. Del. 1983); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 630 (D. Md.
1982).
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cepted the artificial effect test but distinguished the facts before
them.146 For example, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, in Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar,1 47 dis-
tinguished Mobil in a case involving an agreement similar to the
Yates Field lock-up. In the face of Whittaker's hostile tender offer,
Brunswick sold a key asset-its Sherwood medical division-to an-
other potential offeror.1 45 Whittaker asserted that because it con-
sidered Sherwood to be Brunswick's major attraction, the lock-up
would deter Whittaker from increasing its bid. 49 Therefore, as
with the Yates Field option, this action affected normal market ac-
tivity and was manipulative under section 14(e).150
The court rejected Whittaker's argument. 51 It distinguished
Mobil because Brunswick sold the asset instead of "locking it up"
with an option agreement.1 52 The court maintained that the "sale
of a substantial asset by a corporation in the face of a hostile
tender offer standing alone is not a violation of section 14(e). ''153
Despite the elimination of Whittaker by the lock-up, the court
characterized the sale as "part of a healthy market activity" be-
cause Brunswick received a fair price.'54
The Mobil approach1 55 is incorrect because it fails to preserve a
meaningful balance between the target and the takeover bidder.
The court in Mobil correctly focused on the necessity of maintain-
ing unhindered market activity.156 Its definition of manipulation,
146. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 555 F. Supp. 892 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 717 F.2d
757 (2d Cir. 1983); Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. IlM. 1982); cf. Marshall
Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (criticizing the Mobil approach but
distinguishing the facts even if Mobil represented good law).
147. 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. IM. 1982).
148. Id. at 941.
149. Id. at 943-44.
150. Id. at 944.
151. See id. at 949.
152. See id.
153. Id. For a criticism of the distinction between an option to buy and a sale in applying
section 14(e), see Fraidin & Franco, supra note 4, at 825.
154. 535 F. Supp. at 949. The United States District Court for the Western District of
New York also distinguished Mobil in Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 555 F. Supp. 892
(W.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983). The district court held that the lock-up at
issue was not manipulative under the Mobil test because it had a positive impact on the
market, stimulating rather than suppressing competition. Id. at 906.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 117-20, 128-33.
156. See id. at 374.
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however, is simply too broad. The artificial-effect test would pro-
hibit almost all defensive tactics available to management.1 57 All
such tactics, by definition, affect the securities market. Thus, this
approach would restrict excessively management's maneuverabil-
ity, rendering the target powerless in the face of a tender offer.
The Shareholder-Choice Test
In Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc.,' 51 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York devel-
oped a third approach to section 14(e) manipulation. On appeal,
the Second Circuit expressly rejected the district court's approach,
adopting instead the deception test.15 9 Nevertheless, the district
court's shareholder-choice test remains an important alternative to
the deception test. Despite its legal impotence, the court's well-
reasoned analysis may provide a useful guide for courts struggling
to interpret section 14(e).
The district court in Data Probe focused on the in'sufficiency of
the deception test.80 The court accepted in principle the Sixth
Circuit's reasoning in Mobil 61 but narrowed the concept of manip-
ulation even further.1 62 The district court emphasized the inves-
tors' right to decide for themselves between tender offers. There-
fore, it related manipulation and undue interference to meaningful
shareholder choice.1 63 Under this approach, manipulation does not
encompass all actions that adversely affect market activity, as had
been suggested in Mobil.'" Rather, section 14(e) prohibits only
those actions that obstruct the tender offer process in such a way
157. See Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538, 1550
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983).
158. 568 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
160. See 568 F. Supp. 1538, 1544 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983).
161. See id. at 1549-51.
162. See id. The district court in Data Probe recognized that almost all defensive tactics
would be manipulative under the artificial effect test. See id. at 1550.
163. See id. at 1545-48, 1559.
164. The Mobil approach is far broader than the Data Probe approach because Mobil
focused on maintaining unimpeded market activity. The artificial effect test ensures that
the natural forces of market demand will control the tender offer process. Conversely, the
district court in Data Probe considered only the shareholders' interests. An unimpeded mar-
ket is important only insofar as it protects the investor.
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as to deny the shareholders their decision-making prerogative.1 6 5
The court in Data Probe had to determine whether a tender of-
feror's option to purchase two hundred percent of the target's
stock was a manipulative device under section 14(e).16' The court
began its interpretation of section 14(e) with a detailed analysis of
the history and purpose of the Williams Act, concluding that the
Act was not designed merely to provide shareholders with informa-
tion. 67 The court determined that Congress intended the Williams
Act to serve two related purposes. The Act sought "not only to
insure that investors were properly informed," but also to enable
them "to exercise their choice in tender offer disputes without in-
terference."'1  The legislation "concerned not only the provision of
information but the guaranty of a fair opportunity to use it. 1 6 9
The court in Data Probe attempted to define manipulation in
light of these objectives. It determined that, to protect investors'
decision-making prerogative, Congress intended section 14(e) to
prohibit actions that obstruct the effective exercise of informed
shareholder choice.1 70 This meant that the Williams Act entitled
the shareholders "to have placed before them any [tender offer]
and to decide without management's overriding control whether to
accept that offer or ... some other, competing proposal.' ' 71 Activ-
ities that eliminate this meaningful opportunity to decide, accord-
ing to the court, are manipulative.1 72
Applying the shareholder-choice test, the court ruled that sec-
tion 14(e) clearly prohibited the lock-up arrangement at issue.17 3 It
recognized that some stock lock-ups may enhance effective share-
holder choice by spurring competitive bidding. 7 4 The option
granted to CRC, however, completely contradicted the goals of the
165. See 568 F. Supp. at 1545, 1559 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983).
166. See id. at 1543.
167. See id. at 1545-48.
168. Id. at 1559.
169. Id. at 1547. For a similar reading of the intent of the Williams Act, see Weiss, supra
note 20, at 1098-1105.
170. See 568 F. Supp. at 1545, 1559 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983).
171. Id. at 1561-62.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 1561-62; Fraidin & Franco, supra note 4, at 823.
174. See 568 F. Supp. at 1560 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983).
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Williams Act.175 Even if the shareholders rejected CRC's tender of-
fer, or accepted Data Probe's offer, CRC could veto the investors'
decision and accomplish the acquisition by exercising its option. 17 6
The lock-up arrangement thus deprived Datatab's shareholders of
any legitimate choice. It effectively "aborted the tender offer pro-
cess,"177 rendering investor participation meaningless.
The court noted, however, that not all stock lock-ups impermis-
sibly restrict investor choice.J78 The court suggested that it would
permit lock-up agreements involving approximately twenty percent
of the target's outstanding shares.1 79 Although they to some extent
limit investor decision-making, management may find such ar-
rangements necessary to "help begin an auction, or attract higher
prices,"18 0 with the shareholder as the ultimate beneficiary.
Although the shareholder-choice test developed in Data Probe is
more consistent with the purposes behind section 14(e) of the Wil-
liams Act than the two other tests, it has two drawbacks. First,
because the shareholder-choice test is grounded on the Act's broad,
general purpose, its definition of manipulation is necessarily vague.
A wide range of factors affect "investor choice." Second, the share-
holder-choice test requires that courts somehow determine the
lock-up's effect on shareholders. This determination would be too
speculative in all but the clear-cut cases.181
A NEW APPROACH TO MANIPULATION: BALANCING THE SCALES
Each of the three tests that courts have enunciated are inade-
quate in some way. Each, moreover, fails to provide sufficient
meaning to the phrase "manipulative acts" in section 14(e). A sat-
isfactory definition must reflect Congress' notion of investor pro-
tection as effective shareholder choice, but also must be specific
enough to guide the courts. Such a definition exists, one that re-
flects the role of the proscription of manipulation in the overall
legislative scheme. Under this definition, a manipulative act is one
175. Id. at 1562.
176. Id. at 1542, 1562.
177. Id. at 1562.
178. See id. at 1560-61.
179. See id.
180. Id. at 1561.
181. See infra note 227.
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that unduly disrupts the competitive balance between the target
corporation and the tender offeror. The validity of this definition
becomes clearer -after identifying the specific objectives of the Wil-
liams Act.
The Williams Act: Specific Objectives
Any definition of "manipulative acts" under section 14(e) re-
volves around Congress' purpose in enacting the Williams Act.
1 8 2
Because investor protection, or shareholder choice, is the Act's
general purpose, the purpose is too broad to lend specific meaning
to the phrase."8 ' Defining manipulative acts with any precision,
therefore, requires an understanding of the specific objectives un-
derlying the statutory framework-the means by which Congress
sought to achieve its ultimate purpose. Congress attempted to pro-
tect investors by combining two objectives: full disclosure of mate-
rial facts184 (informed choice) and competitive balance between the
target corporation and the takeover bidder185 (effective choice). 8s
The deception test correctly identifies the first objective. Con-
gress intended that disclosure by the tender offer participants be
the primary investor protection of the Williams Act. Most of the
Act's requirements concern the provision of information, and the
committee hearings refer to "disclosure" and "information" almost
as often as "investor. '18 7
182. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
183. Thus the shareholder choice test applied in Data Probe, although accurate, is not the
ideal method of defining section 14(e) manipulation. See infra note 226.
184. See 113 CONG. REc. 854-55 (1967). Senator Williams stated: "The purpose of this bill
is to require full and fair disclosure...." Id.
185. See id. at 24664.
186. See Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538, 1559
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983).
187. See, e.g., Takeover Bids: Bills Providing for Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity:
Hearings on H.R. 14475, S. 510 Before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1968) (testimony of Manuel Cohen, SEC Chairman) ("The
purpose of this bill... [is] to provide information to investors so that they can arrive at an
informed investment decision.") [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]; Senate Hearings,
supra note 85, at 25 (testimony of Manuel Cohen) (the Williams Act "will fulfill the need of
public stockholders to be fully informed"); id. at 70 (testimony of Donald Calvin) (Act's
objective "is to provide full and timely disclosure to stockholders"); id. at 188 (testimony of
Manuel Cohen) (Act "provides [an] application of the traditional full and fair disclosure
policy of the Federal securities laws").
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Senator Williams frequently focused on this objective. During
the Senate Hearings, he commented on "the need to fill the ex-
isting gap in the disclosure pattern of our securities laws by pro-
viding for full disclosure in corporate takeover bids.1 88 Senator
Williams reiterated that the sponsors designed the bill "to require
full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors."' 89
Disclosure guarantees informed shareholder choice. To ensure
that shareholders can exercise that choice meaningfully, however,
Congress also intended to "balance the scales" between target
management and tender offeror. This competitive balance would
ensure that neither party could exploit a superior position to de-
feat the shareholders' interests.1 90 By ensuring competition, courts
would enable the investors to make the final tender offer
decision.' 91
Although not as obvious as the concern for disclosure, the bal-
ancing objective was a recurring theme in the hearings on the bill.
According to Chairman Cohen, Congress designed the Williams
Act so that neither management nor takeover bidders had any spe-
cial privileges. 92 Instead, the Act "reflect[ed] an appropriate bal-
ance among competing interests."1 93 Professor Robert Mund-
heim 94 testified that the Act's supporters perceived the legislation
as "merely balancing the scales equally between outsiders and
management."1 95
Senator Williams also identified this balancing objective. He
noted that the Act focused on "balancing the scales"' 9 as well as
"providing the offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly
present their case. '197 On the day the Senate passed the bill, Sena-
188. Senate Hearings, supra note 85, at 147.
189. 113 CONG. REC. 24664 (1967).
190. See id.
191. See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1277 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on
venue grounds sub noma., Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
192. See Senate Hearings, supra note 85, at 16.
193. Id. at 25. Chairman Cohen also stated that the Act's drafters should "be careful not
to tip the scales to favor either incumbent management or those who would seek to oust
them." Id.
194. Then Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania. Presently, he is the Dean
of the University of Pennsylvania School of Law.
195. Senate Hearings, supra note 85, at 117.
196. 113 CONG. REc. 854 (1967).
197. Id. at 855.
1984]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:115
tor Williams urged once more that the Act's drafters attempted to
"avoid tipping the scales either in favor of the management or in
favor of the person making the takeover bids."19
The Supreme Court 99 and several lower courts200 have recog-
nized Congress' intent to maintain a balance between tender offer
participants. In Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,0 1 the Su-
preme Court explained Congress' "policy of evenhandedness. '20 2
The Court commented that although a balance between competi-
tors was not the ultimate purpose of the Williams Act,
"[n]eutrality" was "one characteristic of legislation directed to-
ward ... the protection of investors. 20 3
Justice White's opinion20 4 in Edgar v. MITE Corp.2 °5 is more sig-
nificant. In ruling that the Williams Act preempted the Illinois
takeover statute,20 6 Justice White focused on the Act's objectives.
He found it "clear that a major aspect of the effort to protect the
investor was to avoid favoring either management or the takeover
bidder. '20 7 According to Justice White, "Congress sought to pro-
tect the investor not only by furnishing him with necessary infor-
198. 113 CONG. REC. 24664 (1967).
199. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1
(1977); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1975).
200. Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980); MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633
F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub noma., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); Great
W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on venue grounds sub
noma., Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Hi-Shear Indus. v. Campbell
[1981] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 97,804 (D.S.C. 1981); Natomas Co. v. Bryon, 512 F. Supp.
191 (D. Nev. 1981); Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Kennecott Corp. v.
Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206 (D.N.J. 1981); Dart Indus. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ind.
1978). But see AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (upholding a
state takeover statute that placed burdensome regulations on hostile takeover attempts).
201. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
202. Id. at 29-30.
203. Id. at 29.
204. Justice White's opinion represented the opinion of the Court only with regard to
Parts I (statement of the facts), H (holding that the case was not moot), and V-B (holding
the Illinois act invalid under the Commerce Clause) of that opinion. Justice White's discus-
sion of the Williams Act was not accepted by a majority of the court.
205. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
206. Justice White held that the Ilinois act was unconstitutional under the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution because the act conflicted with the purposes of the
Williams Act. See id. at 630-640. The Illinois act "upset the careful balance struck by Con-
gress" between the target company and the takeover bidder. Id. at 634.
207. Id. at 633; see also 113 CONG. REc. 24664 (1967).
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mation but also by withholding from management or the bidder
any undue advantage that could frustrate the exercise of an in-
formed choice."208
Several lower courts also have discussed the objectives of the
Williams Act in examining the validity of state takeover statutes.
United States Courts of Appeal for the Third, Fifth and Seventh
Circuits, as well as numerous district courts, have recognized the
Act's balancing objective in the context of state statutes. 2 1 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Great
Western United Corp. v. Kidwell,210 issued the most thorough ex-
planation of the balance Congress intended to establish between
target corporation and tender offeror. The court emphasized that
the "cornerstone" of Congress' approach to investor protection was
"deliberate neutrality" among the tender offer participants. 11 Ac-
cording to the court, this balance was "indispensable" to the
proper operation of the Williams Act.212
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in
MITE Corp. v. Dixon,213 agreed with Kidwell's interpretation of
the Williams Act. The court identified preserving a balance be-
tween the contending sides in a takeover battle as the Act's "prin-
cipal means of investor protection. 2 14 Similarly, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit maintained in Kennecott
Corp. v. Smith215 that the Act sought to balance the target man-
agement and the takeover bidder in such a way that "neither has
208. 457 U.S. at 634 (emphasis added). Although this view was not adopted officially by
the majority of the Court, no other opinion in the case specifically rejected this language.
209. See supra note 200. Even the Second Circuit in Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp.,
717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983), in adopting the deception test, acknowledged Congress' balanc-
ing objective. See id. at 760.
210. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on venue grounds sub nom., Leroy v. Great W.
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
211. See id. at 1277.
212. See id. at 1279-80. The court invalidated the Idaho takeover statute because it dis-
rupted the balance established by the Williams Act. One reason the Idaho act conflicted
with the Williams Act is that it required the offeror to disclose too much information. By
confusing the investor with a "mass of irrelevant data," the Idaho scheme refused the of-
feror a fair opportunity to present his case. See id. at 1280.
213. 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980), af'd sub nom., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624
(1982).
214. Id. at 496.
215. 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980).
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an undue advantage." 218
The Competitive Balance Test
The legislative history of the Williams Act reveals that Congress
had a general purpose of investor protection and a specific purpose
of guaranteeing informed and effective shareholder choice.217 To
effectuate these purposes, Congress designed the Act to accomplish
two specific objectives: full disclosure of pertinent information and
maintenance of a competitive balance between the tender offer
participants.2"" Congress believed that the statute must further
both goals to achieve adequate investor protection.219
After identifying the Act's specific objectives, the meaning of
section 14(e) manipulation becomes clearer. Congress did not for-
bid manipulation to achieve the disclosure objective. Absent the
manipulation language, the section 14(e) prohibition of "fraudu-
lent" and "deceptive" acts still proscribes non-disclosure. 220 There-
fore, Congress must have intended the anti-manipulation provision
to further the balancing objective. Under this view, manipulation
includes any action intended to destroy the competitive balance
between target corporation and tender offeror. Any tactic that af-
fords either party an unfair advantage in the takeover battle is ma-
nipulative under section 14(e).
A corollary definition of manipulation follows from the competi-
tive balance test, one that applies more directly to lock-up arrange-
ments. In any situation involving competing tender offerors,22 a
manipulative action is one designed by management to disrupt the
competitive balance between bidders. The target corporation must
not give one bidder an unfair advantage over his competitors.222
216. Id. at 188.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 83-99.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 188-208.
219. See Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538, 1546-47
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983).
220. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
221. Or any situation in which a competing bidder would make a tender offer absent ar-
rangements between the target management and the original bidder.
222. Weiss maintains a similar view regarding manipulation under section 14(e). He sug-
gests that actions are manipulative when they "block a potential offeror or seller from enter-
ing the market or when they place one offeror or seller in a preferred position vis-a-vis all
others." Weiss, supra note 20, at 1121.
[Vol. 26:115
1984] LOCK-UPS UNDER THE WILLIAMS ACT
Although the legislative history of the Williams Act mentions
nothing about preserving competitive bidding, this corollary defini-
tion is consistent with the objective of balance between manage-
ment and takeover bidder. If section 14(e) permitted the target to
confer a significant advantage on one bidder, it would destroy the
competitive balance between the target corporation and the hostile
bidder. In that situation, management would always win; it could
choose the successful bidder.
The competitive balance test places significant restraints on
management2 23 during the tender offer process. It does not require,
however, management's complete passivity in the face of a tender
offer.224 The legislative history of the Williams Act shows that
Congress recognized management's right to oppose takeover bids
actively.22 5 In fact, requiring management to remain passive would
violate the competitive balance test and undermine the Act's pri-
mary purpose. It would -give the tender offeror an almost insur-
mountable advantage. Any offer at a premium price, no matter
223. Section 14(e) and the competitive balance test apply with equal force to tender offer-
ors as well. The committee hearings clearly indicate, however, that the proponents of the
Williams Act were concerned with limiting the target managements behavior. Chairman
Cohen asserted that the Act would substantially reduce incumbent management's ability "to
frustrate an attractive and desirable tender offer." Senate Hearings, supra note 85, at 184.
Cohen also suggested that the Act would curb certain "unfair" practices presently engaged
in by "entrenched management." Id. at 178.
224. An ongoing debate exists as to whether a target corporation should oppose a take-
over bid. Lipton argues that "once the board of directors has in good faith and on a reasona-
ble basis determined to reject a takeover bid, the target may take any reasonable action to
accomplish this purpose" and should in fact take such action. Lipton, Takeover Bids in the
Target's Boardroom; An Update After One Year, 36 Bus. LAw. 1017, 1017 (1981); Lipton,
Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979); see also Herzel,
Schmidt & Davis, Why Corporate Directors Have a Right to Resist Tender Offers, 3 CoRP.
L. REv. 107 (1980).
Conversely, Easterbrook and Fischel assert that resisting takeover bids reduces share-
holder welfare. Therefore, they advocate a "passivity standard": management should remain
completely passive in the face of a tender offer. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids,
Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAw. 1733 (1981); Easterbrook &
Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94
HARv. L. REv. 1161 (1981); see also Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The
Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. Ray. 819 (1981).
225. See Senate Hearings, supra note 85, at 57 (testimony of Professor Hayes) (manage-
ment has "the resources and the arsenal of moves and countermoves which can adequately
protect their interests"); House Hearings, supra note 187 at 17 (testimony of Manuel Co-
hen, SEC Chairman) (recognizing that management can resist takeover bids, but that the
Williams Act will not assist that resistance).
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how inadequate or contrary to the investors' interests, probably
would succeed unless a white knight appeared on its own initia-
tive.228 Thus, passivity would defeat effective shareholder choice.
The competitive balance test also does not prevent the target
corporation from favoring one bidder over another or from grant-
ing a bidder some advantage. Any arrangement with a favored bid-
der that is consistent with competitive principals is acceptable
under section 14(e). The competitive balance test only prohibits
the allowance of undue advantage. Management's behavior is ma-
nipulative only when the conferred advantage is so great as to pre-
clude or cripple competition.
The Validity of Lock-ups: Applying the Competitive Balance
Test
Under the competitive balance test, a lock-up is manipulative if
it disrupts the competitive balance between competing tender of-
fers.221 7 This test necessarily is subjective to some extent. Because
the circumstances surrounding all takeover battles differ, no rigid
rules can identify the mandated competitive balance in all cases.
Rather, whether a particular lock-up arrangement violates section
14(e) depends on the specific factual situation. The courts essen-
tially must determine on a case-by-case basis whether a given lock-
up device unduly restricts competition.
The courts, however, are not completely without guidance. In
most cases, application of the competitive balance test will render
predictable results. Such certainty is possible because some lock-
226. See Comment, supra note 2, at 704.
227. The shareholder-choice test developed in Data Probe is not inconsistent with the
competitive balance test. The primary difference between the two approaches simply is that
although the Data Probe test derives from the Williams Act's general purpose-maintaining
meaningful investor choice-the competitive balance test is based on Congress' specific
method for protecting that choice. Consequently, the two tests technically should render
identical results.
The competitive balance test is superior, however, for at least two reasons. First, the com-
petitive balance test offers a clearer standard by focusing on something more tangible: the
specific method adopted to achieve the Act's purpose.
More importantly, the competitive balance test allows the courts to narrow the scope of
their manipulation analysis. The courts need only examine the tender offer participants'
actions and then consider the effect of those actions on the other participants. In addition,
courts are reasonably familiar with this type of examination. See supra notes 221-22.
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up arrangements are subject to per se application. Stock lock-ups
granting a majority (or some similar high percentage)22 8 of the tar-
get's shares to a favored bidder, and asset lock-ups involving the
target's "crown jewel" are manipulative per se. Such arrangements
necessarily destroy the competitive balance between tender offer-
ors. They force the disfavored offeror to discontinue bidding be-
cause of the white knight's insurmountable advantage.
The asset lock-ups in Mobil and Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar2 29 fall
into this category. In both, the asset in question was the target
asset most attractive to the hostile bidder, and neither offeror was
willing to continue bidding if unable to acquire the "locked-up"
asset.230 Therefore, these lock-ups completely precluded competi-
tion. The stock lock-up in Data Probe also represented a per se
section 14(e) violation. The option to purchase stock that was the
equivalent of two hundred percent of the target's outstanding
shares necessarily ended the bidding contest. The favored offeror
could acquire the target simply by exercising its option.231
Similarly, other lock-ups are valid per se under section 14(e).
This category includes asset lock-ups involving unimportant target
assets and stock lock-ups that allow the favored bidder to purchase
only a small amount of stock, such as ten percent of the target's
outstanding shares. Such arrangements openly promote competi-
tion by increasing the number of bidders. They simply give the
lock-up recipient a slight advantage to lure it into or ensure con-
tinued participation in a bidding contest. 32
Application of the competitive balance test in the grey area be-
tween these two classes of lock-ups, however, is more uncertain.
The grey area consists of those lock-ups that grant the favored bid-
der a significant advantage, but at least technically allow some
room for further competition. Such lock-ups are not subject to per
228. No bright line exists regarding the percentage of stock that can be lawfully locked-
up. In general, any lock-up granting an offeror over one-third of the targets shares should
be manipulative per se.
229. 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
230. See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d at 375; Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535
F. Supp. at 943.
231. See 568 F. Supp. 1538, 1542, 1562 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983).
232. See Fraidin & Franco, supra note 4, at 823; see supra text accompanying notes 30-
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se application. Instead, the court in each case must determine
whether the challenged arrangement unduly restricts the hostile
offeror's competitive abilities. The standard employed in making
this determination should be whether, in light of all the circum-
stances, a reasonable offeror would continue bidding despite the
lock-up arrangement. 33
For this group of lock-ups, the decision in each case will rest on
the nature of both the lock-up at issue and the bidding contest
generally. In Mobil, for instance, the option to purchase seventeen
percent of Marathon's shares, absent more, probably would survive
section 14(e) analysis. The option price, however, was $35 per
share below U.S. Steel's tender offer price, giving U.S. Steel an ini-
tial $1.2 billion financial advantage.2"4 No reasonable offeror would
continue bidding under such circumstances. Therefore, the lock-up
was manipulative under the competitive balance test.
CONCLUSION
Because of their effectiveness, lock-up arrangements will con-
tinue to play an important role in the tender offer process. In rul-
ing on the validity of these arrangements, however, the courts must
ensure that lock-ups are not used to undermine investor rights by
destroying the careful balance that Congress struck between the
target corporation and the tender offeror. The deception test,
which equates section 14(e) manipulation and misrepresentation,
misinterprets the purpose behind section 14(e) and fails to provide
sufficient investor protection. Because it recognizes Congress' goal
of "balancing the scales" between tender offer participants, the
competitive balance test represents the proper approach to defin-
ing section 14(e) manipulation. Only this approach safeguards the
investors' right of meaningful choice in the tender offer process.
BRADLEY A. MAXA
233. The court should examine all the factors a reasonable offeror probably would con-
sider in determining its course of action. The primary factor in most cases often is likely to
be the offeror's possibility of success after execution of the lock-up.
234. See 669 F.2d at 375-76.
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